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Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) contains an increasing number of diverse objects, ranging
from simple sensors to smart speakers and industrial appliances. The continuing growth
in the number and the diversity of connected devices within enterprises and homes
complicates their management. Vendor-specific protocols cannot solve this problem.
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a framework to negotiate and run EAP
methods, i.e. authentication protocols between client and server. Tens of different EAP
methods exist, and EAP is widely-adopted in WiFi and cellular networks. In some EAP
methods the server can invoke another, “inner” EAP method for additional authentication
inside the same EAP session.
In this thesis we investigate how to apply EAP for managing devices in wireless networks.
Our approach is to add the possibility to send short client tokens from server to client
in EAP session. After successful authentication and completion of the EAP session, the
client uses these tokens to access the management servers.
We have designed several options for transferring client tokens inside an EAP session.
These options were then implemented by extending open-source software components and
evaluated experimentally, using Raspberry Pi as a platform.
Based on our analysis and experiments, the most flexible option for sending client tokens
in EAP is by combination of an outer EAP method (EAP-oPROV) that sequentially runs
two inner EAP methods. The first inner method does peer authentication, and the tokens
are sent to the client in the second inner EAP method (EAP-iPROV). Since the first
inner EAP method is not fixed (it is chosen by the authentication server), there are many
compatible EAP methods for peer authentication in this option. The two new EAP methods
(EAP-oPROV and EAP-iPROV) could be standardized in the future.
Keywords IoT, EAP, authentication, credentials, certificate
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1. Introduction
With the increasing number and diversity of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, the configuration
and maintenance of the devices in WiFi networks are becoming more expensive and complex.
The diversity of the IoT devices is reflected in the many management protocols used by different
vendors.
Authentication, provisioning and configuration operations may be repeated many times during
the lifecycle of the device. These operations occur for the first time when a new device joins a
wireless network. Authentication verifies the identity of the device; provisioning equips the
device with long-term credentials; configuration defines the parameters necessary to the correct
working of the device. Provisioning and configuration can only take place after authentication.
We consider management of a device’s lifecycle in two settings. The first is a large WiFi
network, for instance, a university campus, a company office, or a government building. In this
use case, it would be beneficial to have a unified way for configuring all devices. In addition, the
devices can belong to different users: the management of credentials requires a dedicated and
unified method. The devices also have to be provided with specific rights: depending on their
owners and their function, they may have different access rights granted in the provisioning
step. The second setting is a home WiFi network. Although the number of devices is not large,
the authentication and configuration of each device may be cumbersome for the home user.
In wireless networks, especially in large WiFi networks, authentication is often performed with
the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), which includes a diversity of authentication
methods for different applications. The EAP authentication framework is specified in RFC
3748 [1]. It has been extended with more than fifty different authentication methods like EAP-
TEAP (Tunneled EAP) [2], EAP-TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Security) [3] or EAP-FAST
(Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling) [4]. When a new device wants to connect to a
WiFi network, EAP is used before wireless connectivity is established between the device and
the WiFi AP (Access Point). The type of authentication, e.g., whether it is mutual or one-sided,




Figure 1.1. Entities in the authentication of a peer
session are shown in Figure 1.1.
The peer – also called supplicant in [5] – is the device attempting to access the network,
the authenticator is the WiFi provider, and the authentication server is a server or online
service which can verify the identity of the peer. The peer initially has no IP address and
therefore is limited to communicating with the authenticator. The WiFi provider transfers
the authentication communication to the authentication server. If the authentication server
accepts the peer’s identity, the authenticator will allow the peer to connect to the network.
In addition to the authentication of new device, it is typically necessary to also perform
provisioning and configuration. These three operations – initial authentication, provisioning
and configuration – are often called bootstrapping or on-boarding of the device. Currently,
EAP does not include a generic method for the configuration and provisioning of the connected
device. As a result of the provisioning operation, the device gets an identity and long-term
credentials for subsequent network or service access, e.g., a certificate signed by a certification
authority. As a result of the configuration operation, the device gets the necessary settings for
its correct functioning; for example, it may receive a firmware update.
Two EAP methods are especially relevant to our work: EAP-TEAP (Tunneled Extensible
Authentication Protocol) RFC [2] and EAP-CREDS (Credentials Provisioning and Management)
internet draft [6]. EAP-TEAP includes optional provisioning of certificate to the peer. However,
the support for provisioning is restricted to one EAP method. The EAP-CREDS draft proposal
defines a way to perform provisioning and configuration within an external EAP method (e.g.,
within EAP-TEAP). The proposal has broad goals, including support for several provisioning
protocols and arbitrary length of provisioned data. As a result, EAP-CREDS may be difficult to
implement and test. One disadvantage of doing provisioning and configuration entirely inside
an EAP session is the increase of the authentication server’s load.
In this thesis we investigate a different approach. Only the information that is needed
to initialize provisioning and configuration is exchanged through an EAP method. This
information includes the URLs and access tokens of the provisioning and configuration servers.
A successful completion of the EAP session (i.e., successful authentication) triggers provisioning
and configuration of the device over HTTPS. One advantage of this approach is that there is no
need to send large messages inside EAP session, or include the potentially heavy management
operations inside EAP session.
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The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of networking
technologies that are relevant for our work. Chapter 3 describes the requirements. Chapter 4
presents the design choices studied in this thesis for adding provisioning and configuration to
EAP, and chapter 5 describes the implementation and performance evaluation of these choices.
In chapter 6 we analyze and discuss our results and also outline directions for future work.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
6
2. Motivation and Background
In this chapter we first give a model of device lifecycle and identify the specific state in that
model on which this work focuses. Second, we outline three types of networks where the
EAP-based provisioning and configuration solution could be deployed. Finally, we provide an
overview of the Extensible Authentication Protocol and outline four EAP methods: EAP-TLS,
EAP-TTLS, EAP-TEAP and EAP-CREDS that are especially relevant to our work. Information
about additional EAP methods can be found in Appendix A.
2.1 Device lifecycle
In [7], the lifecycle of an IoT device is defined as having two modes: factory and operational.
In the factory mode, the device is built by the manufacturer and provisioned with initial
credentials. These credentials may include a certificate signed by the manufacturer, and a list
of trusted peers. A device in factory mode can perform bootstrapping and move to operational
mode.
In operational mode, the device communicates with a controller using its operational creden-
tials. In Figure 2.1, the bootstrapping operation moves the device into operational mode, and
factor reset operation moves the device back to factory mode. Factory reset is needed, for
example, when the device changes owner: credentials used by one user should not be available
to the following user.
The bootstrapping procedure can be divided into authentication, provisioning of long-term
credentials and configuration of the device. In this thesis, we consider an additional state
Figure 2.1. Lifecycle of an IoT device (adapted from [7]).
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Figure 2.2. Device lifecycle modes.
between authentication and provisioning operations. It is shown in Figure 2.2 as an additional
Initial Authentication (IA) mode. A device in the IA mode has been authenticated but not yet
provisioned or configured. This additional mode allows the device to be reconfigured several
times without re-authentication. A device in IA mode returns back to factory after a timeout,
unless it has moved to operational mode.
The next sections provide a device management scenario more efficient in number of required
communications, and easier for the end user. Although the additional mode allows wider
application, a separation is required to securely manage the device: in the mode IA, the device
should not have access to all network resources. The network separation may be necessary to
protect from devices which have not yet entirely been initialized.
Configuration determines the purpose of the device. Once configured, the device may be re-
quired to provide a proof of the software it executes (called device attestation): this verification
justifies the separation of network.
2.2 Deployment environments
Our solution for provisioning and configuration of IoT devices can be potentially deployed in
(at least) three types of WiFi networks: campus, home and UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles).
2.2.1 Campus network
The campus WiFi network could be deployed in the premises of an enterprise, like Huawei office,
or a public institution, like Aalto University. The number of devices in the campus network
is large; it could be in the hundreds or even thousands. The network includes many devices
with multiple owners and EAP is typically used for device authentication. Bootstrapping of a
large number of new devices in a campus network could be an issue due to their multitude and
variety.
One approach to solve this issue is to define a specific area (zone) for bootstrapping in the
campus, and do initial authentication of new devices in that area. As a result of the initial
8
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authentication, the device will get short-term credentials. Afterwards the device will be de-
ployed in the campus, and it will use its short-term credentials to obtain long-term credentials
and other configuration information. In this way, the device can be provisioned and configured
anywhere in the campus.
Eduroam [8] is an example of EAP-based roaming between campus networks. In Eduroam,
the authenticator determines the authentication server to connect to upon reception of a
first EAP message by looking at the realm part of the username in the client’s first message.
Suppose, for example, that the device having peer identity “sebastien.boire@aalto.fi” wants
to connect to the WiFi network of Ecole Polytechnique campus in Paris. From the realm part
“aalto.fi”, the authenticator in the campus network routes the EAP messages to the correct
authentication server – in the example, the Aalto University authentication server in Finland.
Upon successful authentication, the authenticator provides network access to the peer.
2.2.2 Home network
Today’s home WiFi networks are characterized by a relatively small number (e.g., about 10) of
IoT devices and users whose technical knowledge varies a lot. A bootstrapping procedure in
home environment typically involves the user, but as little as necessary user’s intervention
should be required. Referring to the lifecycle model in Figure 2.2, the user is required only to
perform authentication in order for the device to reach the Initial Authentication (IA) state:
the user provides the credential with his action. This can be done with an OOB (Out-Of-Band)
channel, for instance using EAP-NOOB [9]. Once in IA state, the device can do provisioning
and configuration without human intervention thanks to initial information provided during
authentication. The device can be updated through regular configuration without human
presence.
Even though EAP is not common in home networks today, as the number and variety of
home WiFi devices increase, it is plausible that some device management mechanisms from
enterprise networks will be taken into use also at home. For example, future home network
could connect to the internet via a gateway device configured with WPA-Enterprise standard
mechanisms.
2.2.3 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle network
There is an increasing interest in networks of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): multiple
applications are considered in civilian and military areas. In [10], the possible applications are
analyzed with the corresponding challenges. Typically, the UAVs form a WiFi mesh network,
and an addition of a new UAV to that network (bootstrapping) is done via a dedicated access
point (AP) in one of the UAVs. Also the communication between the UAVs to the ground station
9
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is routed via a dedicated AP.
Since communication to the ground station takes longer and consumes more energy than
communication with the neighbouring UAVs, it is advantageous to perform only the initial
authentication of new UAV with the ground station, and subsequently do provisioning and
configuration with other UAVs. Please note that initial authentication of a new UAV with the
ground station could be potentially done with EAP.
2.3 Methods for first authentication of the device
The first authentication of the device takes place before any provisioning. Therefore, the device
may be unidentified at that time. First authentication relies on specific mechanisms. In [11],
first authentication methods are classified in four groups:
• Managed methods: there is a pre-existing credential in the device, which is used for first
authentication. This first credential may have been provided by the manufacturer.
• Ad-hoc methods: first authentication is executed using an Out-Of-Band (OOB) channel.
For instance, EAP-NOOB identifies the client by its physical closeness to the controller.
Other OOB channels include sound, ultrasound, a QR code or a button on the client.
• Leap-of-faith methods: these methods assume the first connection was honest. Future
authentication will verify that the device has the same identity as on first authentication.
• Hybrid methods: the combination of managed and ad-hoc methods is the most commonly
used.
2.4 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
EAP [1] is a generic framework for transporting messages of different authentication methods,
called EAP methods. It is a request-response protocol: for example, the peer (client) answers
with a response to the authentication server’s request, and then the server can send a new
request. EAP can operate directly on top of wireless LAN or PPP (Point-to-Point) protocol [12]
without establishing an IP connection. EAP is often used in wireless networks to authenticate
the client before granting network access.
EAP does not natively provide fragmentation support: one message cannot be split in several
packets. Therefore, the size of one message is limited by the MTU (Maximum Transfer Unit)
on the link. However, some EAP methods can provide fragmentation support (for instance,
methods exchanging certificates like EAP-TTLS).






Figure 2.3. EAP protocol stack
Code Id Length Type Payload
Figure 2.4. Format of an EAP packet
• Code (one byte): indicates whether it is a request or a response.
• Identifier (one byte): helps associate a response to a request.
• Length (two bytes).
• Type (one byte): determines the nature of the payload. Some of the types are Identity,
Notification, One Time Password, Expanded Types.
• Payload.
The payload is specific to the type of the packet. Some types are described in figure 2.1.
Type code type name
1 identity, this communicates an unprotected identifier [1]
2 notification, this allows the transfer of arbitrary data [1]
3 NaK, this is a response to an unacceptable proposed method [1]
4 MD5-challenge [1]
5 OTP (One Time Password) [1]
6 GTC (Generic Token Card) [1]










EAP-TLS (Transport Layer Security) [13] defines the execution of a TLS handshake [16] within
EAP. It may be run as EAP method when the client already has a certificate: the server can
request client authentication within the TLS handshake with a certificate.
EAP-TLS provides session resumption, fragmentation and sharing of key material.
Although EAP-TLS provides strong security, it requires the distribution of certificates to the
client, which could be costly in a large network.
2.4.2 EAP-TTLS
EAP Tunneled Transport Layer Security (EAP-TTLS) [3] is a method allowing authentication
of the server, secure encrypted communication, and authentication of the client. It operates in
two phases:
• Phase one: the server is authenticated by the client, and they exchange materials for an
encryption key. At the end of phase one, a TLS channel has been established between the
client and the authentication server.
• Phase two: the client authenticates the server, and the client may authenticate the server
depending on the phase two algorithm. This step is optional.
Unlike EAP-TLS, the client certificate is optional: it is therefore easier to use in large networks.
Figure 2.5 describes the execution of EAP-TTLS with the messages transferred between each
of the three entities taking part.
2.4.3 EAP-TEAP
EAP Tunneled Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP-TEAP)[2] is an EAP method widely
used in wireless networks. It allows mutual authentication, secure encrypted channel and pro-
visioning of certificate to the client. EAP-TEAP operates in two phases, both being mandatory:
• Phase one: a TLS handshake allows server authentication and setting of a secure
encrypted tunnel.
• Phase two: additional information is exchanged in the encrypted tunnel. This can include
client authentication.
EAP-TEAP uses TLV objects in phase two.
EAP-TEAP supports the execution of an EAP-method within phase two: internal EAP packets
are wrapped in TLV objects used by EAP-TEAP in phase two, as an inner EAP method.
EAP-CREDS can be executed at this level of EAP-TEAP. It is also possible to perform client
12
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authentication and client provisioning in phase two. Multiple internal protocols can be executed
sequentially in phase two.
The provisioning of the peer can be performed via a certificate or via a Protected Access
Credential (PAC). A PAC contains a key and a field used for long-term authentication to the
authentication server. The development of provisioning motivated the evolution of EAP-FAST
[4] into EAP-TEAP. A PAC allows fast re-authentication over EAP, wheas a certificate can be
used either as long term credential for the client, or to learn the identity of the local authority.
This evolution supports the interest of executing provisioning inside EAP.
The execution of an internal EAP method is performed with the TLV type EAP-Payload-TLV.
Figure 2.6 represents the EAP-TEAP communication with its two phases.
However, EAP-TEAP is one specific EAP method: the peer may not support this EAP method,
resulting in incompatibility. In addition, the configuration is not performed in EAP-TEAP.
Since the configuration data may be quite big, it may be impossible to add in phase two of
EAP-TEAP.
2.4.4 EAP-CREDS
EAP Credentials Provisioning and Management (CREDS) [6] [17] is a specification draft for
secure provisioning and configuration of the client through EAP.
EAP-CREDS operates within several EAP methods, like EAP-TLS or EAP-TEAP. EAP-CREDS
focuses on the communication of credentials after the establishment of a secure authenticated
channel. EAP-CREDS includes three phases:
• Phase one: initialization. This step selects the credential management protocol.
• Phase two: provisioning (optional). The two parties exchange the credential data. These
messages include two parts: the provisioning headers and the provisioning data.
• Phase three: validation (optional). This step allows the authenticator to verify that the
credentials have been correctly received and interpreted by the peer.
EAP-CREDS uses TLV objects to transport the credentials. Most of credential types are
supported: X.509 certificate, public key, symmetric key, username and password, and one-time
password are compatible with EAP-CREDS.
With EAP-CREDS, it is possible to perform authentication, provisioning and configuration
within EAP protocol. This implies that a single server performs these three tasks. Although
EAP-CREDS is a possible solution to provisioning and configuration, it relies on fragmentation
within EAP in order to send long messages. EAP is not adapted to send long information –
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e.g. configuration information. Therefore, it would be interesting to limit EAP to sending the
minimal required information and then configure the client with another protocol.
2.5 WiFi Protected Access
WiFi Protected Access (WPA) is a security certification program defined by the WiFi Alliance
standard. WPA and its successors (WPA2 and WPA3) provide sets of protocols that satisfy
security requirements. The security requirements protect from known attacks on connection
to a wireless network.
2.5.1 Network categories
WPA separates networks in two categories. WPA-Personal focuses on home and small pro-
fessional networks. It does not require an authentication server and relies on WPA-PSK
(pre-shared key): the client connects to the authenticator using a password, from which an
encryption key is derived. WPA-Enterprise addresses enterprise networks and requires an
authentication server.
2.5.2 EAP support on WPA-Enterprise
WPA-Enterprise supports the following EAP methods:EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2, EAP-
PEAP/MSCHAPv2, EAP-PEAP/GTC (Generic Token Card), EAP-PEAP/TLS, EAP-SIM, EAP-
AKA, EAP-FAST. The choice of method depends on network configuration.
EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA rely on a SIM module in the client for authentication. All other EAP
methods listed perform a TLS handshake to obtain a secure communication tunnel.
Enterprises that require high security in their internal network commonly use EAP-TLS where
client certificates are mandatory: all devices must have a certificate to access the network.
(Please note that it is possible to use client certificates also in other TLS-based EAP methods.)
In universities and open environments, the distribution of device certificates for EAP-TLS is
too restrictive.
2.5.3 WiFi connection establishment
A WiFi connection is initiated with the EAPOL (EAP over LAN) protocol [5]. Depending on
its configuration, EAPOL does not always call EAP. For instance, in a WPA-Personal network,
EAPOL does not authenticate the client, and only generates an encryption key from the
password. The connection establishment is represented on Figure 2.8.
When a user manages IoT devices in his home via a cloud platform (e.g., Amazon’s IoT Core
AWS), the EAP authenticator can be located in the home gateway, and the authentication
14
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server in a the cloud platform.
In WPA-Enterprise, EAP is executed before the exchange of EAPOL Key messages. With the
execution of an EAP method, the EAPOL messages are encrypted using the key materials
generated by EAP. An example of a WPA-Enterprise protocol where the authentication is done
using EAP-PWD is shown in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.6. Messages in EAP-TEAP with internal EAP method in phase 2
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Figure 2.9. WPA2-Enterprise message exchange with EAP-PWD MIC: Message Integrity Check
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3. Requirements for successful adoption
Our system design is driven by the following requirements:
• Our solution should not impact the WiFi access point, i.e., the EAP authenticator; only
the authentication server and the client are updated. The number and the diversity of
already deployed WiFi access points make their update an issue.
• The changes performed on EAP must ensure backward compatibility: a client or server
not updated to support these changes must be able to successfully communicate with an
updated end-point.
• The solution should not be restricted to a single EAP method; it should preferably fit
with a large number of EAP methods, in order to be useful in many scenarios.
• The impact due to adding our solution to existing EAP method should be minimal to
reduce the work needed for its adoption.
• The additional payload sent over EAP should be small; it must fit in a single EAP message
to avoid fragmentation. (Recall that EAP does not include fragmentation.)
• The additional payload must be sent in a secure manner (ensuring its confidentiality,
integrity and authenticity), because provisioning and configuration data is sensitive
information.
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4. System design: options for managing the client
through EAP
As explained in the previous section, new solutions can be designed as extensions to EAP.
Below, we identify several different options for adding information to EAP. The limits for each
option are described, allowing a first selection on the most promising strategies to perform
device management over EAP.
After describing the chosen architecture model, we specify what information must be added to
EAP messages. The two last sections describe the possibilities for adding very small data and
larger data in an EAP session.
4.1 Presentation of the architecture
In figure 4.1, communication A happens before communications B and C. The WiFi provider
modifies the packets in this communication and transfers some packets to the authenticator.
On the other hand, the WiFi provider does not modify packets in communications B and C.
Communication A uses EAP since the peer does not have network access yet. After commu-
nication A, the peer obtains network access, and may obtain an IP address with the DHCP
protocol. Then, communications B and C take place using another protocol, such as HTTPS.
The transition between communication A and communications B and C is ensured with
additional data in the EAP session of communication A. Ideally, this additional data would be
compatible with all EAP methods and not require fragmentation. It would only contain the
necessary data to securely connect to the provisioning and configuration services in stages B
and C.
In order to cover most possible situations, we separate the three server functions: authentica-
tion, provisioning and configuration servers. This results in an architecture that is adaptable
to various types of networks. In figure 4.2, the peer contains three applications, each one
communicating with a different server.
The authentication server verifies the identity of the client. The provisioning server manages
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Figure 4.2. Description of the configuration - general presentation
the distribution of long-term credentials, e.g., certificates, to the client. The configuration
server manages the configuration of the client. The three servers allow management of the
client during its lifecycle. The role of each server is described in figure 4.2.
In (A), the client authenticates with EAP. The EAP method executed allows the authentication
server to send a set of tokens for the device to perform provisioning and configuration.
In (B), using the information received in (A), the client connects to the provisioning server over
HTTPS and obtains a certificate. This certificate allows reconnection to the network as well as
strong authentication with other services on the network.
In (C), using the information received in (A), the client connects to the configuration server
over HTTPS, authenticates to the configuration server using the certificate obtained in (B),
and receives any information necessary for correct operation.
The transfer of the set of tokens between the client’s applications can be performed either with
a system call or with the storing of the data on the client’s file system.
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Figure 4.3. In EAP-CREDS, provisioning and configuration of the client is performed inside EAP session.
EAP-CREDS is always run inside another EAP method, which provides security and fragmentation of
the messages.
4.2 Advantages of this architecture
The management of a device at the beginning of its its lifecycle requires all three operations of
authentication, provisioning and configuration. Authentication is necessarily the first operation
to be executed. Because authentication is often performed with EAP, taking advantage of EAP
to prepare the next steps – provisioning and configuration – can achieve easy adoption of new
devices.
Another possible architecture is to perform all three steps within EAP. This is the goal of
the draft EAP-CREDS [6]. However, EAP is initially adapted to the communication of short
messages, whereas configuration may require arbitrarily large data transfer. It results in a
less mutable setting: one server has to perform all three steps of authentication, provisioning
and configuration. In addition, software development is faster in HTTP and REST services
rather than inside the protocol stack.
The chosen architecture allows compatibility with more settings: the three servers may be in
different locations, provisioning and configuration servers can use any protocol. The client
may in addition perform regular configuration, whereas authentication is only required once:
separating authentication and configuration allows easier configuration.
In comparison, the architecture proposed by EAP-TEAP and EAP-CREDS is more restrictive.
In both figures 4.3 and 4.4, all communication occur within EAP messages. In comparison, the
strategy considered in this thesis operates with communications outside of EAP.
4.2.1 Content of the bootstrapping data
The bootstrapping data allows the client to securely connect to the provisioning and configura-
tion servers. Therefore, the bootstrapping data must contain the following:
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Figure 4.4. In EAP-TEAP, provisioning of the client is performed in EAP-TEAP through EAP messages. There is
no standard configuration in EAP-TEAP.
• URL of the configuration server. The URL includes the protocol to use: for instance,
configuration over HTTPS can result in the URL “https://config.com”.
• Credentials for secure access to the configuration server.
• Expiration date of the credentials to the configuration server.
• URL of the provisioning server. The URL includes the protocol to use: for instance,
provisioning over EST can result in the URL “est://provision.com”.
• Credentials for secure access to the provisioning server.
• Expiration date of the credentials to the provisioning server.
4.2.2 Possible applications
The multiplication of device management protocols induces complexity: network managers
must support multiple protocols at the same time, and private users must learn a new user
experience for each device. Creating a unique protocol with preexisting standards allows
standardization with a low cost of adaptation. Therefore, the aim is to modify one existing
protocol as little as possible in order to allow long-term device management for all devices.
EAP as initial protocol is justified by its widespread use and its inherent extensibility.
A device may have received from its manufacturer some initial credentials. However, these
credentials cannot be used by the user as the device may change owner; hence each operational
phase should use different credentials specific to the current user. Adding initial information for
provisioning and configuration in the authentication step allows simplification of management:
the device learns how to communicate with its environment in its first authentication. In
addition, separating provisioning and authentication increases the adaptability of the protocol.
When adding new states between the factory and operational mode, it may become necessary to
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isolate devices which have not yet performed provisioning on a specific network and give them
limited access. This network separation is necessary only if additional security verification is
performed with the provisioning and configuration steps. For instance, there may be device
attestation [18] joined with provisioning: the device proves a set of claims that define its rights.
Therefore, the device should execute the following steps upon initialization:
• Authentication: the device executes EAP authentication with either the manufacturer’s
credentials or an OOB channel. If successful, the access point adds the device to a
restricted network.
• Provisioning and configuration: on the restricted network, the device can access the
provisioning and configuration servers.
• Re-authentication: the device authenticates again with EAP, this time using the data
obtained from the provisioning. Upon verifying the credential, the access point adds the
device to the unrestricted network.
The distinction of the two networks is only necessary if the device has to perform additional
identity validation during provisioning. Therefore, it is not necessary to separate the two
networks in a home environment.
4.3 Secure communication transfer from authentication server to configuration and
provisioning servers
4.3.1 Presentation
After the peer has successfully authenticated to the authentication server, it starts commu-
nicating with the configuration and provisioning servers. However, these two servers have
not verified the identity of the peer yet. Therefore, they need to be ensured that the peer has
successfully authenticated to the authentication server. This verification must happen before
the peer receives configuration and provisioning data. This can be performed in several ways:
• OTP (One Time Password): the authentication server provides the peer with a password,
and the peer then securely sends the password to the configuration and provisioning
servers. This requires the servers to communicate securely. Alternatively, the OTPs can
be generated sequentially from a master key shared between the three servers, hence
avoiding additional communication. The sharing of a master key adds some requirements
however: the servers need to be synchronized with the same time, and the key must have
been pre-shared.
• Signature: the authentication server signs a message with the username of the peer and
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a claim (stating that the peer has authenticated at some date). The peer can transfer this
signed message as a proof of authentication to the configuration and provisioning servers.
4.3.2 One Time Passwords
In the successful concluding message sent by the authentication server to the peer, the server
creates a unique password. Combined with the username, it will allow connection to the other
two servers. The password is generated as:
Generate(counter, date, username)=HMAC(masterkey, counter);
counter++;
This ensures that no key is used twice. Then, the other servers can generate a list of possible
passwords and verify that the one received from the peer is in this list. The limitation of this
method is that the security relies on a single key, which has to be pre-shared among the servers.
The sharing of the key can be more difficult if there are multiple instances of each server.
4.3.3 Signature
Transferring the authentication of the peer via a password is unnecessary: the authentication
server can sign a proof that the authentication is successful. Therefore, the verification can be
performed only with the public key of the authentication server - considering that the signature
is performed with the authentication server’s public key.





The signature algorithm used has to provide a short signature in order to save space on the
EAP message. Therefore, RSA keys are avoided. Instead, the signature algorithm used is
ES256 (SHA256 with ECDSA). The peer transfers this signed message to the next two servers,
which can verify its validity with the public key they have previously stored. The presence of a
datetime in the payload ensures that the peer does not use an old - and more easily leaked
- authentication to obtain provisioning and configuration. This method is valid if the signed
message is transferred securely from the authentication server to the peer. Therefore, the EAP
method needs to encrypt the communication.
It is possible to put the signing time or the end of validity time in the signed message. However,
choosing the end of validity time grants the delivering entity the choice for the validity duration
of the token. Otherwise, the end of validity duration is chosen by the entity receiving the
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Figure 4.5. First message exchange in an EAP session
signed message. Giving the choice to the authentication server increases security since this
entity is already strongly protected.
This second solution is selected for its ease of deployment. The signed message is implemented
with JSON Web tokens. This format is defined in [19]. This format ensures ease of implemen-
tation and compatibility. The attribute end_validity is set to now + 5 minutes in order to avoid
excessive use of the signed message.
4.4 Transfer of short information in EAP
In addition to the bootstrapping data, the EAP communication must include a negotiation on
whether to send the bootstrapping data itself. Indeed, authentication is performed at every
connection of the client to the network, whereas provisioning is necessary only on the first
connection, and the configuration may follow a specific schedule of updates. There are several
possibilities for adding short information to EAP conversation.
4.4.1 NAI or decorator
In Figure 4.5, the first message exchange in an EAP conversation is described. Each of the two
messages include an anonymous username, i.e. a string with no restriction on its value.
EAP conversation starts with an Identity message on each side, including an anonymous iden-
tifier of the sender. The first EAP message is an EAP-Request/Identity from the authenticator,
followed by an EAP-Response/Identity sent by the client to the authentication server. This
identifier is not encrypted and therefore is not used in the authentication. It is possible to add
a decorator to the user part of the NAI (Network Access Identifier) to share information on
whether the server supports sending the bootstrapping data, and whether the client wants to
receive the bootstrapping data. The decorator is appended to the user string. In some scenarios,
the presence of a decorator can prevent correct authentication of either the server or the client.
Therefore, background compatibility is not complete.
The first message EAP-Request/Identifier is sent from the authenticator, not the authentication
server: if the authenticator can route to different authentication servers (e.g., the Eduroam
network), the decorator in the first EAP-Request/Identifier from the authenticator must include
whether each authentication server supports the sending of the bootstrapping data. Because
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EAP messages have a limited size, it limits the number of authentication servers connected to
the authenticator. This is necessary to inform the client whether the authentication server
can send the bootstrapping data. As described in [20], the decorator is separated from the the
username by the character for “end of string”.
The second message EAP-Response/Identifier is sent from the client. The client can add a
decorator to specify whether it requests the bootstrapping data. However, if the authentication
server does not support this update, the decorator might prevent correct authentication: the
client must only add the decorator if the authentication server understands this decorator. If
the client adds a decorator but the authentication server does not understand it, authentication
will fail in spite of valid credentials.
This method has the advantage of being universal among all EAP methods: the Identity
message exchange occurs before the initialization of an EAP method. The lack of backwards
compatibility and diversity of application settings limits the use of NAI decorators, which
goes against the requirements. The use of decorators has been described in [20]: although it
confirms the possibility of adding NAIs in the first message exchange, standardization is not
compatible with the large range of applications of EAP.
4.4.2 Client credential type in TLS handshake
Several common EAP methods use a TLS handshake in the first phase. The client can
authenticate in the TLS handshake with a certificate. Alternatively, the client can authenticate
after completion of the TLS handshake with a different type of credentials. The sharing of
a certificate by the client in the TLS handshake can determine whether the client wants to
receive the bootstrapping data or not. Indeed, if the client has already been provisioned with a
certificate, it does not need to connect to the provisioning server again. The authentication
server adapts its messages accordingly:
• The client sends a certificate: the server does not send the bootstrapping data.
• The client does not send a certificate: the server sends the bootstrapping data after
authenticating the client with a different credential type.
This method is compatible with several commonly used EAP methods. However, it has two
disadvantages. First, the specification of some EAP methods have to be changed in order to
include sending of the bootstrapping data. Second, a client not updated to support this logic
may have no certificate to provide: the reception of the bootstrapping data may lead the client
to terminatie the EAP communication with failure.
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4.5 Solutions for adding bootstrapping data
EAP communication strongly depends on the EAP method executed. In order to ensure
compatibility among the EAP methods, we analyze how to add information to EAP messages.
The bootstrapping data is a set of tokens allowing secure communications with the provisioning
and configuration server.
4.5.1 Addition of a notification message
The EAP framework [1] defines fundamental types of messages: the type “Notification” allows
the communication of a printable message. This is meant to transfer important information to
the user that does not result in an error. Notification messages are by default allowed in EAP
methods. The content of a notification message is not described in the specification, allowing
its use for additional information. The communication of notification messages does not modify
the state of the ongoing EAP method.
Extract from RFC 3748 [1]:
The Notification Type is optionally used to convey a displayable mes-
sage from the authenticator to the peer. An authenticator MAY send a
Notification Request to the peer at any time when there is no outstand-
ing Request, prior to completion of an EAP authentication method.
Figure 4.6 describes the communication with an additional notification message containing
the bootstrapping data in JWT format. This method is compatible with all EAP methods. It
has two disadvantages:
• No security: the notification message is not encrypted or authenticity protected by default.
Therefore, the content can be read by all on the network.
• Single message: the notification message does not allow two-directional communication:
the client cannot request the bootstrapping data. Therefore, the notification message
should be sent in every EAP execution.
Adding a notification message with a specific content requires modifying the behavior of the
client and authentication server, and the EAP specification: the treatment of a notification
message should differ depending on the content. This change in the EAP [21] specification is
unlikely to be adopted.
4.5.2 Addition of an attribute to a preexisting message
Several EAP methods send attributes in the EAP payloads. EAP-TTLS uses AVP objects after
the completion of the TLS handshake, while EAP-PEAP, EAP-TEAP, EAP-FAST, EAP-POTP
use TLV format. Adding an attribute with a new type requires modifying the selected EAP
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Figure 4.6. Messages in EAP-TTLS with a notification message carrying the configuration data
method specification. It avoids adding a new message, which would increase the duration of
the communication. However, adding one attribute does not allow asking the client whether it
wants the bootstrapping data. Therefore, the bootstrapping data has to be mandatory in the
EAP conversation.
4.5.3 Addition of an inner EAP method
Some of the most widely used EAP methods set up a TLS tunnel for communication (e.g.
EAP-TTLS, EAP-PEAP, EAP-TEAP, EAP-FAST). It is possible to execute another EAP method
within the tunnel, hence taking advantage of the secure communication channel. The creation
of a new EAP method, called EAP-iPROV (EAP-Inside PROVisioning), that occurs inside a TLS
tunnel and sends the bootstrapping data is an efficient solution: it allows future improvements
and respects the EAP specification. Figure 4.8 describes the protocol stack with EAP-iPROV.
EAP-iPROV allows the bootstrapping data to be optional and only sent if the client requests it.
It also avoids modifying previously existing specifications. Instead, only the configuration files
of the client and authenticator need to be modified (supposing that both support EAP-iPROV).
Figure 4.9 describes the messages exchanged in EAP-iPROV when the peer wants to receive
the bootstrapping data. If the peer is not interested, it returns in the first response a TLV
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Figure 4.7. Additional attribute carrying the configuration data in EAP-TTLS message exchange




Figure 4.8. EAP-iPROV protocol stack
version with value 0: the server stops EAP-iPROV, reaching an early success state. Therefore,
EAP-iPROV only adds one message exchange when no token is necessary.
4.5.4 Addition of an outer EAP method
The creation of an additional EAP method, called EAP-oPROV (EAP Outside PROVisioning ),
allows encapsulating multiple successive EAP methods. Therefore, it is possible to execute
inside EAP-oPROV the succession of one authentication EAP method, e.g., EAP-TTLS, and
one configuration EAP method, e.g., EAP-iPROV, as described in Figure 4.10. This structure
has the advantage of supporting all EAP methods, instead of only methods creating a tun-
neled communication. The security of EAP-iPROV is provided by encrypting the EAP-iPROV
messages using the key materials from the authentication EAP method.
EAP-oPROV has one disadvantage: the bootstrapping data can be sent only if EAP-oPROV
and EAP-iPROV are supported by the client. In comparison, adding an inner EAP method
as described in 4.5.3 can be performed as long as the client supports EAP-iPROV and one
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Figure 4.9. Messages in EAP-iPROV when the peer wants the configuration data




Figure 4.10. EAP-oPROV protocol stack
standard EAP method that creates a master secret key (MSK).
4.5.5 Comparison of each solution among EAP methods
In Table 4.1, the strategies for adding the bootstrapping data are compared on each EAP
method. The table is completed with no change allowed to the different methods’ specifications.
In the table, “+” indicates support; “-” indicates no support.
Adding a notification message requires changing the server’s behavior for one EAP method, or
for the EAP framework. Adding an attribute requires changing the specification of the method.
An inner EAP method does not rely on specification change.
4.6 EAP-iPROV: design choices
The solution of adding an inner EAP method to transfer the bootstrapping data is implemented.
This new method EAP-iPROV (EAP Provisioning Inside) has to follow requirements:
• No fragmentation is required. It allows maximum support on different external EAP
methods.
• The server sends the bootstrapping data in a message. The data has to be authenticity
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Table 4.1. Comparison of available changes between EAP methods
protected.
• The client indicates if it wants the bootstrapping data.
• EAP-iPROV must verify the version of the method supported by each party.
The communication can be executed in two round trips. The different attributes are carried
as TLV objects. Figure 4.11 describes the content of the messages when the client wants to
receive the bootstrapping data. If the client does not want to receive the bootstrapping data, it
sends the Version TLV with value 0: the server reacts to this value by terminating the method
with success state.
The attribute EAP-Response Version TLV contains only one byte with the value of the version
if the client wants to receive the bootstrapping data, and 0 otherwise.
When EAP-iPROV is executed as inner method, the identity message exchange at the beginning
and the Success (or Failure) message at the end are absent. EAP-iPROV requires the external
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Figure 4.11. TLV objects included in the messages in EAP-iPROV.
EAP method to allow an inner EAP method to execute in an encrypted channel. This is possible
with EAP-TTLS, EAP-TEAP, EAP-PEAP and EAP-FAST as external EAP method, as well as
with EAP-oPROV, which will be discussed next.
4.7 EAP-oPROV: design choices
In order to increase the number of EAP methods that can be executed with EAP-iPROV, we
can wrap the EAP communication in EAP-oPROV (EAP Provisioning Outside). EAP-oPROV
carries TLV attributes. The following EAP types are defined:
• TLV-EAP: the content is an EAP message.
• TLV-ENCRYPTED: the content is an encrypted TLV object.
• TLV-VERSION: the content is the version of the protocol.
• TLV-ERROR: the content is an error type.
• TLV-SUCCESS: the content is a success message.
• TLV-FAILURE: the content is a failure message.
EAP-oPROV has two phases, described in figure 4.12:
• Phase one: authentication. Phase one performs an EAP method to authenticate the client,
called the authentication method. Any EAP method that exports a key can be executed.
At the end of phase one, if the authentication method is successful, EAP-oPROV takes
the key material obtained from the authentication method. The key material can be used
in phase two to encrypt TLV attributes.
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Figure 4.12. Structure of EAP-oPROV with EAP-iPROV in phase two
• Phase two: configuration. Phase two can perform any other EAP methods, and each TLV
object can be encrypted with authenticated encryption. EAP-iPROV can be performed
with all messages encrypted. Once the server has executed all desired EAP methods, it
reaches the state success.
Each inner EAP method allows a method negotiation between the peer and the server: this
is allowed by starting a new EAP conversation for each inner method. This allows larger
compatibility.
In order to securely support all inner EAP methods, EAP-oPROV must provide encryption and
fragmentation.
4.8 Summary of the protocol options
Four options have been considered above. In Figure 4.13, these four options are summarized
with their respective protocol stacks. EAP is supposed to run over the EAPOL protocol,
although this is not a requirement.
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Figure 4.13. Protocol stacks of the four options for updating EAP. Auth. EAP is the standard EAP method used
for authentication.
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5. Implementation and performance comparison of
different strategies
In order to accurately compare the solutions designed in the previous sections, each solution
is implemented on the same testbed. After describing the implementation environment, we
analyze the performance in order to determine which solution to retain. The comparison is
based on the ease of integration of the solution in EAP, the number of bytes transferred in the
EAP session and the duration of the EAP session. The reference for comparison is a widely
used and secure EAP method, EAP-TTLS with inner MSCHAPv2 password verification.
5.1 General architecture
The proof-of-concept is implemented on two Raspberry Pi. The client is a Raspberry Pi 4 model
B, connected to a router for ssh connection. The server is a Raspberry Pi 3 model B+, also
connected to a router for SSH (Secure Shell) connection. The two Raspberry Pi communicate
with each other over WiFi, as shown in Figure 5.1.
The client Raspberry Pi contains:
• WiFi client: this program manages the WiFi interface, and implements EAP.
• Configuration client: this program manages the configuration with the configuration
server.
• Provisioning client: this program manages the provisioning with the provisioning server.
The server Raspberry Pi contains:
• WiFi AP (Access Point): this program creates a WiFi access point.
• Authentication server: this program authenticates the client with EAP. EAP messages
are transferred by the WiFi AP.
• Configuration server: this program manages the configuration.
• Provisioning server: this program manages the provisioning.
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Figure 5.1. System experimental setup










































Figure 5.2. Description of the configuration, with implementation references - general presentation
The structure of the experimental setup is represented in Figure 5.2. The presence of both
authenticator and authentication server in the same device is realistic, as the two programs
operate on different ports.
5.1.1 WiFi client and authenticator
Both WiFi client and authenticator are implemented with the use of [26]. The authenticator
is implemented with hostapd, and the WiFi client with wpa_supplicant. The configura-
tion of the WiFi client is performed in the file /etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf . It
specifies the client’s credentials and the EAP method to use. The WiFi AP is set to commu-
nicate with the authentication server using RADIUS protocol. The authentication server
can verify the client’s credential with the configuration files /etc/hostapd/hostad.eap_user and
/etc/hostapd/hostapd.radius_client.
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5.1.2 Provisioning and configuration components
The WiFi client (EAP peer) transfers the received tokens to the provisioning and configuration
clients. We have implemented these in two Python scripts. Recall that the client tokens are
JSON objects. The client uses these tokens to access the management servers over HTTPS.
The provisioning of the client certificate is done using EST protocol [27]. We used “Simple
Python EST server + CA” [28] as the EST server. We have implemented the configuration
server in a Python script.
5.1.3 Raspberry Pi
Raspberry Pi is a set of single-board computers developed by the Raspberry Pi Foundation.
Initially meant for educational purposes as a low-cost computer, it is also used for other
applications including robotics and proof-of-concept designs. The devices support several
Linux based operating systems, including RaspiOS developed specifically for Raspberry Pis.
Raspberry Pi has a strong community and many software libraries provide compatibility. These
advantages determined the choice for Raspberry Pi as hardware in the proof-of-concept.
Raspberry Pi 3 model B uses a 1.2 GHz 64-bit quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 processor, with one
gigabyte of RAM. Raspberry Pi 4 model B uses a 1.5 GHz 64-bit quad-core ARM Cortex-A72
processor, with four gigabytes of RAM. Both provide Ethernet connectivity with RJ-45 ports
and WiFi access. Both Raspberry Pi use a 64 gB SD card, flashed with RaspiOS for operating
system.
5.1.4 hostapd
Hostapd is a WiFi provider software. It is documented by the Raspberry Pi foundation as a
solution for using a Raspberry Pi as a wireless access point. This insurance of compatibility
and large support determined the choice of hostapd in the proof-of-concept. Jouni Malinen’s
implementation supports Linux and provides EAP authentication with use of a RADIUS
(Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) server.
Several EAP methods are supported by Jouni Malinen’s hostapd, including EAP-AKA, EAP-
TTLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-SIM, EAP-PEAP, EAP-FAST, EAP-PWD, EAP-PSK and EAP-MD5.
It is possible to separate in two distinct processes the wireless access point from the RADIUS
server. In this scenario, the two processes know each other’s URL. The RADIUS server
is configured with the client credentials from the file /etc/hostapd/hostapd.eap_user. The
RADIUS server can also use a database to store client credentials.
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5.1.5 wpa_supplicant
wpa_supplicant is an open source software providing a WiFi client according to IEEE 802.11i[5].
It was chosen for its Linux compatibility, large EAP support and available implementation
from Jouni Malinen. It supports WPA and WPA2 standards. wpa_supplicant includes an
EAP client. It includes the parameters for client authentication: the credentials, allowed EAP
methods and parameters of the methods.
5.2 Implementation of EAP modifications
Four strategies have been implemented:
1. Addition of a notification message.
2. Addition of an attribute in EAP-TTLS secure tunnel.
3. Addition of an inner EAP method, called EAP-iPROV, in EAP-TTLS secure tunnel.
4. Addition of an outer EAP method, called EAP-oPROV, supporting first EAP-TTLS, then a
configuration EAP method.
5.2.1 Addition of a notification message
The EAP specification includes the message type “Notification”. It is sent by the authentication
server to the peer and contains a human readable message. The message carries an important
information but still optional. The client can ignore the Notification message.
The notification message is carrying an encrypted JSON object: it is not human readable. The
client must correctly interpret this message, which requires a change to the EAP specification.
The authentication server sends the notification message before the final success message, but
after successful completion of the authentication algorithms. Therefore, it is only sent if the
authentication is successful.
Although this solution is implemented, change to the EAP specification is rigorous and thus
can take a long time before adoption.
Performance
We compare the performance of a normal EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 session with an EAP-
TTLS/MSCHAPv2 session including a notification message.
Table 5.1 underlines the additional payload for the server of 728 bytes. The client only has a
small additional message to send. The notification message is received by the client without
necessary replay by the server.
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EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 8 1561 7 1987 0.313[0.208, 0.419]
EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2
with notification message 9 2389 8 2005
0.504
[0.377, 0.620]
Table 5.1. Comparison of performance on EAP-TTLS with optional notification message
Each cell contains the median value, followed by the segment [minimum, maximum] val-
ues when the value may vary. The values are determined on a sample of at least 20 EAP
conversations.
5.2.2 Addition of a notification attribute
This is implemented with EAP-TTLS method. Before reaching EAP-success state, the RADIUS
server reaches an intermediate state in which it sends the notification message. This is
achieved by modifying the RADIUS server. Once the client responds to this notification
message, the server sends the EAP-success message. The notification message contains the
tokens as a JSON encoded in UTF8.
Adding the notification as optional
On this conversation, we want to add the following information:
• Information one: the RADIUS server wants to inform the client that he supports the
sending of a notification message
• Information two: the client wants to tell the RADIUS server whether he wants or not to
receive the notification message
Information one can happen in several ways:
• In the message “EAP-Request/Identity” sent by the authenticator, there is an attribute
containing a string, identifying the authenticator to the client (currently “hello”). It is
possible to specify the string so that it informs the client whether the RADIUS server
supports the notification message. However, this message is sent directly by the authen-
ticator, not the RADIUS server. Therefore, the authenticator needs to know whether
the RADIUS server supports the notification message beforehand. In addition, the au-
thenticator may be configured with several authentication servers, each one managing a
different client domain name: the authenticator must in that case inform the client with
the list of authentication servers supporting the notification message. This increases the
additional data to send in the message ’EAP-Request/Identity’.
• It is possible not to inform the client: the client simply tries to request a notification
message and sees if the server reacts accordingly. If the client does not know information
one, the behavior of the client must be compatible with the server independently of the
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EAP version used (adding a modification to the username does not work for instance,
because it may prevent correct authentication with not updated servers).
The second possibility satisfies the requirements and limits the implementation changes.
Information two can happen in several ways:
• Option A: the client can adopt a specific domain name. For instance, his identifier may be
“ttls-user@iot.huawei.com” if he wants the notification message, and “ttls-user@huawei.com”
if he does not want the notification message. This information is transferred in the mes-
sage “EAP-Response/TTLS: AVP(EAP-Response/Identity), AVP(MSCHAPv2 challenge)”
as the username. The disadvantage is that a server which does not support the notifica-
tion message may be misled in incorrectly interpreting the username.
• Option B: the client can send a specific username in his first message “EAP-Request/Identity”,
which includes his anonymous username “ttls-user”. The disadvantage is that a server
which does not support the notification message may be misled in incorrectly interpreting
the username.
• Option C: it is possible to take advantage of the different authentication methods of the
client to obtain a different behavior of the RADIUS server. If the client authenticates
with a password, the authentication server will consider that the client is authenticating
for the first time, hence wants a notification message to perform a complete bootstrapping.
If the client authenticates with a certificate, the authentication server considers that the
client has been authenticated before, hence does not send the notification message.
Option C is the most promising: it is compatible with previous versions of EAP and does not
require any additional change in the messages. Only the behavior of the RADIUS server has to
be updated. However, in order to follow the TLS handshake protocol, the TLS options have to
be specific. According to the RFC 5246 [16], the client authentication with a certificate occurs
in the following condition:
• The server sends a CertificateRequest to the client.
• The client sends a list of certificates. The server must be able to validate the certificate
authority of the chain. If the client does have any certificate to send, he must send a
certificate list of length zero.
• If the server does not consider the client’s certificate valid or if the client’s certificate chain
is of length zero, the document does not restrict the behavior of the server. Therefore,
the server can either conclude the handshake with a failure message or continue the
handshake without client authentication.
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Table 5.2. Comparison of performance on EAP-TTLS with optional configuration attribute
Each cell contains the median value, followed by the segment [minimum, maximum] val-
ues when the value may vary. The values are determined on a sample of at least 20 EAP
conversations.
In the implementation, the sending of the tokens in a notification message is determined
according to option C.
The information on whether the client successfully authenticated with a certificate is managed
in the hostapd server by writing in a file. This is valid as proof-of-concept but does not support
multiple client connections. Therefore, it is only for testing purposes. The TLS handshake is
managed in hostapd by an external library (e.g., openssl): sending a variable from the external
TLS library to the RADIUS program was not possible without changes to the TLS library. This
problem was avoided by writing the variable in a file.
Performance
We compare the performance of one EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 conversation with tokens in an
optional attribute (with a client certificate), with a traditional EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 (with a
client certificate) conversation.
In Table 5.2, several differences appear:
• Duration difference: the addition of a notification message in the EAP session adds 0.2
seconds: the delay may come from the compiling and execution of the Python script
generating the tokens.
• Message length difference: only the server sends more bytes with the optional configura-
tion attribute. The increase is about 700 bytes.
5.2.3 EAP-iPROV in EAP-TTLS
Implementation choices
EAP-iPROV is implemented as a new EAP method. hostapd allows the definition of additional
EAP methods. The creation of a new EAP method does not require any change in the authen-
ticator. EAP-iPROV uses TLV objects with two bytes for type, two bytes for length, and the
following TLV type codes:
• TLV(ConfigPayload): code 9.
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Table 5.3. Performance of EAP-iPROV in EAP-TTLS
Each cell contains the median value, followed by the segment [minimum, maximum] values
when different values have been recorded. The values are determined on a sample of at least
20 EAP conversations.
• TLV(Version): code 8.
• TLV(ACK): code 10.
• TLV(Failure): code 11.
Although EAP-iPROV is kept as simple as possible in this thesis, it is possible to extend its
applications by defining additional TLV types.
Performance
From Table 5.3, EAP-TTLS/EAP-iPROV results in a small increase in duration and number of
bytes of the conversation compared with a standard EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2.
5.2.4 EAP-oPROV with EAP-TTLS
Implementation choices
EAP-oPROV follows the same format of TLV objects as EAP-iPROV: two bytes for type, two
bytes for length. The TLV types are different:
• TLV(Encrypted): code 2.
• TLV(Version): code 8.
• TLV(EAP): code 7.
• TLV(Success): code 10.
• TLV(Failure): code 11.
Encryption
The encryption is performed on one TLV object, including the type and length bytes. It uses
the AES-GCM algorithm for authenticated encryption. The key is derived from the 64 bytes
long Master Session Key (MSK) of the key materials obtained in phase one from the inner
authentication EAP method.
However, obtaining the key material from the inner phase one method may depend on the
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Table 5.4. Performance of EAP-oPROV with two inner methods: EAP-TTLS followed by EAP-iPROV. The values
for each method are based on a sample of about 100 EAP sessions. Each cell contains the median value,
followed by the [minimum, maximum] range.
software used. Indeed, the key materials generated by an EAP method is available after
the EAP method has reached the status “SUCCESS”. This status is reached upon successful
conclusion of the method. The state SUCCESS is reached differently by the client and the
server:
• Server: since the server sends the Request messages, it determines which message in the
method will be the last. Upon sending of this last message, the server switches to state
SUCCESS.
• Client: the client determines the EAP method as successful upon reception of a message
with content only sent as final step of the method.
Therefore, the key materials are available once the last message of the EAP method is received
by the client. This implies that there is no need for an EAP-Success message in order to access
the key materials. In EAP-oPROV, the absence of EAP-Success message on conclusion of an
inner method is not problematic to access the key materials generated by the inner method.
Performance
In Table 5.4, EAP-oPROV is compared with a standard EAP-TTLS method. The addition of
client tokens adds around one kilobyte of data sent from the server. The duration increases by
0.7 seconds: this is acceptable for registering a device.
Example application
In Figure 5.3, EAP-oPROV encapsulates EAP-TTLS for authentication, and EAP-iPROV for
configuration. EAP-iPROV can be encrypted with the key materials from EAP-TTLS, although
this is not shown in this example. In the implementation, there is an inner EAP-Identity
exchange before starting any inner EAP method. This is unnecessary in practice.
5.3 Separation of networks
In order to secure the devices at the beginning of their lifecycle, it may be required to separate
devices in IA (initial authentication mode) 2.2 state from devices in O (operating mode) state.
For instance, devices in IA state may only have access to the provisioning and configuration
servers, whereas devices in state O may have unrestricted access. This separation is imple-
mented in the WiFi access point and can be done on different protocol layers. For example,
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security can be implemented in the application layer 5.4 by requiring the client to provide
a certificate for use of application on the local network. This section focuses on two possible
solutions in order to separate networks.
5.3.1 Separation with VLANs
The access point may assign the client to a specific VLAN, depending on its state. The
assignment to one VLAN is determined by the authentication server.
First, the device performs initial authentication with the manufacturer’s credentials. The
authentication server concludes this EAP conversation with a success message to the access
point, joined with an assignment of the device to VLAN 1. On this VLAN, the client only has
limited access to the network. For instance, the client may only access the configuration and
provisioning servers. Once the client is provisioned and configured, it authenticates to the
access point with the credentials obtained during provisioning. The authentication server
assigns the client to VLAN 2 upon success of the authentication. Once the access point assigns
the client to VLAN 2, the client has full access to the network.
This operation is possible with specific software. The authentication server must support
dynamic VLAN assignment. This is only possible with specific RADIUS server implementations
– for instance FreeRadius. The implementation of the RADIUS server provided by Jouni
Malinen’s implementation does not support dynamic VLAN assignment. The access point must
accordingly support dynamic VLAN assignment.
5.3.2 Separation with SSIDs
Figure 5.4. Protocol stack
Source: Wikipedia
The access point may advertise two networks with different ac-
cess rights. The client identifies to the access point on network
one using its manufacturer’s credentials. It then performs config-
uration and provisioning. Afterwards, the client can identify to
the access point on network two using the credentials obtained
during provisioning. The process is similar to the use of VLANs.
This operation is possible with specific hardware. The access
point must be able to manage two networks: this requires a
specific WiFi card. The ability of a WiFi card to provide several
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* #{ managed } <= 1, #{ P2P-device } <= 1, #{ P2P-client, P2P-GO } <= 1,
total <= 3, #channels <= 2
* #{ managed } <= 1, #{ AP } <= 1, #{ P2P-client } <= 1,
#{ P2P-device } <= 1, total <= 4, #channels <= 1
...
The attribute “#{ AP } <= 1” determines the maximum number
of SSIDs supported by the access point. The WiFi card present
on a Raspberry Pi only supports one SSID. Therefore, the im-
plementation relies on the addition of a WiFi card connected to the Raspberry Pi hosting the
access point.
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Figure 5.3. Messages in EAP-oPROV with inner EAP-TTLS and EAP-iPROV, when the peer wants the
configuration data
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6. Analysis and discussion
In the previous chapters we have outlined several protocol options for initiating provisioning
and configuration of the client using EAP:
i. Sending the provisioning data to the client in EAP notification message.
ii. Adding a provisioning attribute to a some existing EAP method’s message.
iii. Running an EAP-iPROV method without EAP-oPROV inside a TLS tunnel configured by
an outer EAP method;
iv. Using EAP-oPROV as a wrapper for multiple EAP methods.
There are issues with the protocol option (i). First, the client cannot request the configuration
data or reply to it. Second, a notification message is specified in [1] to contain a printable
message destined to the user. This is different from our intended use.
There are issues also with protocol option (ii). The first is the same as above: the client cannot
request the configuration data or reply to it. The second issue is that adding an attribute in a
pre-existing message is specific to a single EAP method. If we want to add provisioning and
configuration in another EAP method, then a similar modification has to be applied.
The applicability of (iii), running an EAP-iPROV method inside a TLS tunnel configured by
an outer EAP method, without EAP-oPROV, is limited to those EAP methods that use a TLS
tunnel.
Using EAP-oPROV in (iv) as a wrapper for multiple EAP methods has the following advantages.
First, since a large set of EAP methods can run inside EAP-oPROV, there is a large set of
different authentication methods that can be used with EAP-oPROV. Second, EAP-oPROV is
flexible with respect to the choice of inner methods. In addition to EAP-iPROV one or more
inner EAP methods can be run inside EAP-oPROV; moreover, EAP-iPROV can be replaced
by another inner method. For instance, EAP-oPROV could execute the draft EAP-CREDS [6]
after the first inner method.
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In summary, EAP-oPROV is the most promising protocol option to initiate provisioning and
configuration with EAP.
In the rest of this chapter we will analyze the security of EAP-oPROV, and then compare it with
the approach where provisioning and configuration of the client are done entirely inside EAP-
TEAP. We then describe a series of experiments to evaluate the latency and communication
overhead of different protocol options. The chapter ends with section about future work.
6.1 Security analysis of EAP-oPROV
Recall that EAP-oPROV operates in two phases (see Figure 4.12). In phase one, a generic EAP
method is executed for authentication. This first inner EAP method provides authentication
and key establishment. In phase two, a second inner EAP method is executed to share a
configuration message. This second inner EAP method is encrypted using the key materials
from the first inner EAP method.
The following requirements are present for a secure EAP-oPROV:
• In the authentication server:
– Only allow secure EAP methods with mutual authentication, e.g., EAP-TTSL, EAP-
TLS, EAP-FAST, EAP-PEAP, EAP-AKA, EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA’, EAP-NOOB.
– Authentication methods must be up-to-date, e.g., EAP-TTLS v1 [29], EAP-PEAP v2
[30].
• In the client:
– Only allow secure EAP methods with mutual authentication, e.g., EAP-TTSL, EAP-
TLS, EAP-FAST, EAP-PEAP, EAP-AKA, EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA’, EAP-NOOB.
– Authentication methods must be up-to-date, e.g., EAP-TTLS v1 [29], EAP-PEAP v2
[30].
– The JSON Web Tokens must only be sent over an encrypted and authenticated
channel.
– The certificate of the authentication server must be verified.
• In the authenticator:
– The connection to the authentication server must be secure, and the authenticator
must not be corrupted.
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6.1.1 Securing second inner EAP method
Apart from EAP-MD5, all standard EAP methods generate a master session key (MSK) upon
successful completion. The MSK is at least 64 bytes [1] and can be used to encrypt further
communications. The generation mechanism of the MSK depends on the EAP method executed.
The security of the MSK varies accordingly.
The confidentiality of the second inner EAP method for configuration is ensured by the
properties of the phase one EAP method. This increases the importance in the choice of
the phase one EAP method. The phase one EAP method should provide mutual authentication
in order to avoid man-in-the-middle attack. In a mutual authentication method, both ends
must respond to a challenge on the password in order to prove their identity. These challenges
avoid corruption of the messages by an intermediate attacker. In addition, the master session
key generated by the phase one EAP method must depend on all the authentication algorithms
used during phase one.
In that regard, several EAP methods should be avoided. For instance, EAP-TTLSv0 generates
a master session key from the TLS handshake parameters. Therefore, the inner authentication
method – for instance MSCHAPv2 algorithm – does not influence the resulting MSK. As a
result, it is possible for an attacker to act as a man-in-the-middle and obtain the correct MSK,
without knowing the pre-shared secret.
This problem occurs with EAP-TTLSv0 [3] and is solved in EAP-TTLSv1 [29] by binding the
MSK to the inner authentication method. EAP-PEAPv1 [15] is protected against man-in-the-
middle attack by using the compound authentication binding [31] method, and EAP-PEAPv2
[30] binds the MSK to the inner authentication method. Compound authentication binding
adds a message exchange containing MACs of all MSKs generated during the EAP session.
However, hostapd implementation implements version 1 of EAP-PEAP without compound
authentication binding: the MSK only depends on the parameters of the TLS handshake.
Therefore, this implementation is insecure against the man-in-the-middle attack.
The MSK is used to create a symmetric key:
key = hmac_sha256_kdf(MSK, label = “Derive EAP-iPROV message key”||
phase 1 method name||EAP-oPROV identifier, salt = peer identifier, length = 16)




Figure 6.1. Encrypted message format in EAP-oPROV
The first message description focuses the content of the AAD (associated additional data). The
second message description focuses on the payload structure.
(enc, tag) = aes_gcm(message,AAD, key = key, iv = 12 random bytes)
The AAD is the associated additional data: it provides information on the encryption algorithm,
version and data type. The message sent contains the elements enc, aad, iv and tag. The
encrypted message format is described in Figure 6.1.
The key includes identifiers specific to the phase one method with the phase one method name,
peer identifier and EAP-oPROV identifier. These elements ensure that the key is different
in each EAP session. AES-GCM [32] provides authenticated encryption with associated data
(AEAD).
6.1.2 Threats and attacks
Several attacks are possible during the execution of EAP. First, if the peer or the authenti-
cation server is compromised, the attacker has access to the credentials stored in the device:
authentication becomes unsecure. Therefore, we consider situations where the peer and the
authentication server are secure. The attacker can either manage to corrupt the access point,
or act as man-in-the-middle. In either case, the attacker has access to all EAP messages and
can modify them. In a man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker acts between the peer and the
authenticator: it impersonates the authenticator to the peer, and the peer to the authenticator.
In practice, the attacker provides a WiFi access point to which the client can connect. In this
scenario, the attacker must be unable to successfully modify and replay the messages. If some
part of the EAP session is encrypted, the attacker must be unable to decrypt it.
In order to avoid replay attacks, the session must include a nonce: in EAP-oPROV, the nonce
is created in the phase one inner method – which is secure according to requirements. This
nonce must be transferred to phase two: the encryption is performed using the MSK generated
by phase one. The MSK includes a nonce according to the requirements – security of the





5 · 10−1 1 · 10−1 10−3 10−6 10−9
32 1.5 · 105 6 · 104 6 · 103 1.86 · 102 7 · 100
64 1010 4 · 109 4 · 108 12 · 106 4 · 104
128 4 · 1019 1.7 · 1019 1.65 · 1018 5.2 · 1016 1.6 · 1015
256 8 · 1038 3.1 · 1038 3 · 1037 9.6 · 1035 3 · 1034
Table 6.1. Number of hashes to be computed to reach a given probability of collision p(k,N), depending on the
length of the hash.
MSK, a nonce being included in these parameters. Therefore, replay attack is only possible in
EAP-oPROV if it is possible in the phase one inner method.
The security of the encryption in phase two has been discussed in Section 6.1.1.
The ability to modify messages in phase one depends on the security of the phase one method
used. The requirements listed in 6.1 restrict accordingly the EAP methods to be used.
6.1.3 Security of JSON Web Tokens
The configuration data is structured with JSON Web Tokens. The algorithm used for signing
is ES256, which is ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256. This algorithm uses an asymmetric key
pair, which allows easy verification by multiple servers, while only the authentication server
can generate the token.
Within the tokens, the authentication provides a truncated hash of a certificate for each server
the client should trust. The truncated hashes are chosen of 16 bytes long. An attack is possible
by finding a collision attack. This supposes a choice in the certificates of each server: this
attack can only be performed by the manufacturer itself.
The probability p(k,N) of collision of k hashes is





where N is the number of possible values of the hashes, and k ≪ N [33]. Table 6.1 summarizes
the values of k that would result in a given probability of collision p(k,N) for N = 232, 264, 2128
and 2256.
The choice of 128 bits for hash length is sufficient to obtain protection against collision attack.
The use of a JSON Web Token without a password supposes that the token will never be shared
with an attacker. In the JSON object sent from the authentication server to the client, the
client token is joined with the server’s certificate hash which should receive the token. When
the client connects to the provisioning or configuration server, it should receive and verify the
server’s certificate before sending the client token protected by encryption. In addition, the
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expiration date in the client token limits the leaking of a token: an attacker having obtained
the token can only use it for a limited time.
6.1.4 Peer anonymity
In an EAP session, the peer sends its identity to the authenticator in its first message, before
starting any EAP method. The username sent in this first message allows the authenticator to
decide which authentication server to connect to based on the domain name appended to the
username.
EAP-oPROV can support peer anonymity, where the peer sends an anonymous identity, e.g.,
anonymous@aalto.fi, to the authentication server in the first EAP-oPROV message, and the
actual identity, e.g., sebastien.boire@aalto.fi, is sent afterwards encrypted in the first inner
method. This would protect user privacy from eavesdroppers on the network path between the
client and the authentication server.
One example of first inner method that conceals the actual identity is EAP-TTLS, when it
is used in such a way that the client identity is sent inside encrypted TLS channel. Another
example is EAP-TLS when it is used with TLS 1.3 in such a way that only the server is authen-
ticated during handshake; after the TLS channel is established, the client is authenticated
using Post-Handshake Client Authentication mechanism of TLS 1.3.
6.2 Comparison with EAP-TEAP
EAP-TEAP includes provisioning of certificate to the peer within the TLS tunnel established by
the method ([2], section 3.8.2). EAP-TEAP does not have a mechanism for sending configuration
data to the peer, but it has a possibility to add vendor-specific extensions to the protocol. Thus,
it is possible to add configuration data within this method by using Vendor-Specific TLV inside
the TLS channel, and we have implemented this extension in EAP-TEAP.
Please note that in order for this addition to work, both peer and authentication server have
to understand how to interpret this TLV, and vendor-specific TLVs are not standardized.
This restricts the applicability of adding client configuration to EAP-TEAP in vendor-specific
extension.
Configuration data can be large, for example if it contains a device’s firmware update. After
implementing this extension, we have found experimentally that EAP peer exits with failure
when the configuration data is large. The reason is that in hostapd implementation of EAP-
TEAP the maximum size of any message is at most 16 kB, i.e. the configuration data cannot be
bigger than 16 kB. The probable reason is that the maximum record size in TLS is 214 bytes,
which is 16 kB [16].
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Figure 6.2. Data successfully sent by the server to the client over HTTPS (top line) and in EAP-TEAP (bottom
line) as a function of the size of the configuration file.
In order to remove this restriction, one would have to implement some sort of message
fragmentation layer in the vendor-specific extensions of EAP-TEAP. But another way to remove
this restriction would be to use the ideas from our solution: instead of the full configuration data,
the EAP-TEAP vendor-specific TLV would include only a client token, and the configuration
would happen over HTTPS after EAP-TEAP success.
In Figure 6.2, we compare the size of the data sent by the server over HTTPS on the one hand,
and in EAP-TEAP on the other hand, as a function of the size of the configuration file. In both
cases the data transferred by the server includes (server) parts of the TLS handshake, the
provisioning protocol and the configuration protocol.
First, we notice that the server transfers about 8 kB less data in EAP-TEAP than in the
HTTPS session. This is because in addition to the configuration data itself, the HTTPS session
includes the TLS handshake where the server sends its certificate to the client. We did not
try to optimize the HTTPS communication in any way. The provisioning of client certificate
using EST opens a new TLS session for each message. As a result, provisioning over HTTPS
includes four TLS handshakes, which explains the 8 kB difference.
Second, transferring configuration file of 16.3 kB over EAP-TEAP fails; the fragmentation
mechanism in EAP does not allow messages bigger than 16 kB. But the configuration data can
easily be larger than 16 kB, for instance if it includes software updates. This restricts the use
of EAP-TEAP to relatively small configuration files that are less than 16 kB.
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Figure 6.3. EAP-TEAP communication captured with Wireshark, modified with the transfer of provisioning and
configuration data in the TLS channel.
Raspberr_85 : b0 : c9 is the server, 4e : 32 : 15 : c7 : 46 : f7 is the client.
Messages 1 to 2: EAP initialization messages
Messages 4 to 11: TLS handshake with server and client certificate
Messages 12 to 17: MSCHAPv2 method in the TLS channel
Messages 18 to 21: agreement on success of authentication, establishment of cryptographic
material, transfer of provisioning and configuration data
Message 22: conclusion of EAP communication
Figure 6.4. EAP-oPROV with inner EAP-TTLS and EAP-iPROV communication captured with Wireshark.
Time is in seconds, length is in bytes.
Raspberr_85 : b0 : c9 is the server, 4e : 32 : 15 : c7 : 46 : f7 is the client.
Messages 3 to 15: phase one of EAP-oPROV, executed with EAP-TTLS.
Messages 16 to 19: phase two of EAP-oPROV, executed with EAP-iPROV.
The client tokens are sent in messages 18.
In Figure 6.3, the configuration and provisioning data are sent after successful client authen-
tication. The structure of the message containing the additional data is described in Figure
6.5.
The TLV object of type “Vendor-Specific” contains the TLV of type 201, with the configuration
data as payload; the TLV of type “PKCS#7” contains the provisioning data. The Vendor-
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Figure 6.5. Content of the message carrying the provisioning and configuration data
Time is in seconds, length is in bytes.
The “TLV Unknown (201)” contains the configuration data. The “TLV PKCS#7” contains a
certificate answering the request of the client previously sent as a PKCS#10 TLV.
Specific TLV also includes an identifier of the vendor – in this example, the identifier is set to
“0x09090909”. The Vendor-Specific TLV is not mandatory: a client that does not understand its
content can still authenticate successfully.
6.3 Experiments
We have done a series of experiments to evaluate the latency and communication overhead
of different protocol options. First, we varied the size of the configuration data to compare
the performance between EAP-TEAP and the use of client tokens. Second, we have fixed the
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sizes of provisioned certificate and configuration data to about one kilobyte and 400 bytes
respectively. The 400 bytes of configuration data could include, for example, network-specific
parameters.
In the following, we focus on a small configuration data of about 400 bytes.
(i) As a baseline, we measured the performance of EAP-TEAP with and without provisioning
and configuration. A shell script invoked EAP-TEAP repeatedly for 20 minutes, and tcp-
dump communication records were collected from these runs. EAP-TEAP was configured
so that both client and server send certificates to each other during TLS handshake. We
run EAP-TEAP both with and without provisioning and configuration. The results of this
experiment are summarized in rows (0) and (1) of Table 6.2.
(ii) Next, a similar script repeatedly invoked EAP-oPROV with inner methods EAP-TTLS
(for mutual authentication) and EAP-iPROV (for sending provisioning and configuration
tokens), followed by provisioning and configuration over HTTPS. EAP-TTLS was con-
figured so that both client send certificates to each other during TLS handshake. The
results of this experiment are summarized in rows (2) and (7) of Table 6.2.
(iii) The measurements were repeated for EAP-TTLS with EAP-iPROV followed by provision-
ing and configuration over HTTPS. The results of this experiment are summarized in
rows (3) and (8) of Table 6.2.
All in all, about 100 runs were done for each protocol option during the experiment. We wrote
a Python script to filter and compute statistics from these records. Table 6.2 summarizes the
results.
The first column of the table identifies the protocol option whose performance we have mea-
sured. For brevity, we will use the number of protocol option instead of its full name when
discussing the table entries below. For example, we write “protocol (1)”, instead of “EAP-
TEAP+provisioning and configuration”. The other columns of the table contain the number
of messages and amount of data sent by client and server. If there was variation in those
numbers between protocol runs, we provide the median and the extremes in square brackets
across all protocol runs. For example, “10 [10, 11]” in row (3), second column, means that the
median, minimum and maximum number of messages sent by the server was 10, 10 and 11
respectively.
The table is divided horizontally into three blocks. The first block (protocols (0), (1), (2) and
(3)) includes EAP messages only. The second block (protocols (4), (5) and (6)) includes the
HTTP communication for provisioning and configuration after successful completion of the
EAP method in protocols (2) and (3). Please note that these HTTP communications have not
been optimized: the client creates a new TLS session with the server for each EST protocol
57
Analysis and discussion
request. The third block (protocols (7) and (8)) includes both the EAP communication and the
subsequent HTTP communication, to obtain total cost for authentication, provisioning and
configuration.
Looking at Table 6.2, we see that:
- Comparing protocol (0) and (1) we see that adding provisioning and configuration to EAP-
TEAP authentication adds about 2 kB, and less than 0.1 s.
- Protocol (1) takes roughly 0.5 s, while protocols (2) and (3) take about one second. The reason
for the additional time in the latter is the initialization of the two EAP methods: EAP-TTLS
and EAP-iPROV.
- The number of messages in protocols (1), (2), and (3) is about 10. Note that (3) has one
message and 32 bytes more than than (2), and it takes 0.04 second more time. This is because
there is one extra EAP Hello message in EAP-oPROV.
- Less data is exchanged in protocol (2) or (3) than in (1), because in (2) and (3) the actual
provisioning and configuration happen outside of the EAP exchange.
- Protocol (4) has more messages and takes longer than (5), because the EST protocol used in
(4) includes several round trips, while (5) is completed within a single round trip.
- The time for running (4) and (5) is about 0.3 second; but (6) takes about 0.9 second. The
reason is that in (6), the operations (4) and (5) are run inside a Python script in the IoT device,
which adds the overheads of context switching and compilation.
- The transfer of configuration and provisioning data over HTTP adds about 14 kB. This
overhead could be reduced. For example, since each TLS handshake involves exchange of about
two kilobytes, reducing the number of TLS handshakes from three to one in EST provisioning,
would reduce the amount data by about four kilobytes. We leave these optimizations to future
work.
All in all, in our experiments provisioning and configuration with EAP-TEAP is faster (by about
0.5 s) than EAP-oPROV/EAP-iPROV. The amount of data exchanged inside the EAP-TEAP is
larger (by about 600 B) than that inside EAP-oPROV/EAP-iPROV. The reason is that in case of
EAP-oPROV/EAP-iPROV, the actual provisioning and configuration happen over HTTPS, after
EAP-oPROV success.
Recall that EAP-oPROV runs first an inner EAP method (in phase one) and then EAP-iPROV
inside its session. It (only) requires mutual authentication and session key from the inner EAP
method (in phase one). Moreover, EAP-oPROV is extendable, because the authentication server
has full control over which inner EAP methods are run inside EAP-oPROV. For example, the
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Table 6.2. Summary of experimental measurements of provisioning and configuration with EAP-TEAP,
EAP-oPROV and EAP-iPROV with EAP-TTLS as inner method.
Each cell contains the median value, followed by the segment [minimum, maximum] values
when different values have been recorded.
Also, the authentication server may choose not to run EAP-iPROV at all, i.e. EAP-oPROV
can be used to combine different EAP methods. Thus, EAP-oPROV is a generic method for
extending EAP functionality. It could be applied in scenarios other than provisioning and
configuration.
EAP-iPROV can be executed not only inside EAP-oPROV, but inside EAP-TTLS for instance.
EAP-iPROV can be potentially used to exchange any information that is short enough to fit in
a single packet. However, this requires specification of the intended usage of that information.
In conclusion, using the generic method EAP-oPROV for provisioning and configuration is less
efficient than adding provisioning and configuration functionality into one specific method
(EAP-TEAP), but it is more widely applicable because it can be combined with many EAP
methods.
6.4 Future work
Future work could include the following.
- Defining support for fragmentation in EAP-oPROV. Indeed, EAP-oPROV messages add a
header are slightly bigger than the messages of the inner methods because of the addition
of a header. The inner method messages are smaller than the MTU, and the addition of the
header can lead to an EAP-oPROV message bigger than the MTU. This rare situation must be
avoided: providing fragmentation in EAP-oPROV is a solution, fragmentation in EAP being
easy to implement thanks to its structure of request and response.
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- Defining the client tokens that can be used in EAP-iPROV (it may be advantageous to define
client tokens for different types of configuration). It is necessary to define all types of client
tokens that could be necessary to allow large adoption of EAP-iPROV.
- Writing specification for both methods EAP-oPROV and EAP-iPROV, and submitting it to
IETF.
- Adding EAP-oPROV and EAP-iPROV to EAP implementations.
- Implementing a solution for bootstrapping an IoT device that does not yet have long-term
credentials. The solution would have both (i) initial identification of the device using an
ad-hoc or a hybrid method, [11]. and (ii) provisioning and configuration with EAP-oPROV and
EAP-iPROV. For example, the initial identification could be done using EAP-NOOB.
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7. Conclusion
EAP is widely used for peer authentication in wireless network. On the other hand its use for
client management is limited to EAP-TEAP [2] and EAP-CREDS, which is an internet draft.
In both cases the EAP method includes (only) the provisioning of a credential (e.g., certificate)
to the client and this operation is done entirely inside an EAP session.
In this thesis we consider a different approach, where we add support in EAP method for
transferring client tokens from the authentication server. A client token includes the URL
of the management server, the client identity signed by the authentication server and a
timestamp. The actual client management operations, like provisioning and configuration,
happen over HTTPS after successful EAP authentication; the client uses the tokens to access
the management servers.
This approach can be implemented with rather small changes in the EAP method and without
any changes in the WiFi access point (EAP authenticator). On the other hand, it entails some
sort of separation of devices that have the client tokens, but have not yet been provisioned and
configured. This separation can be done on application, IP or data link layers.
We have designed the following four options for transferring client tokens inside an EAP
session. These options were then implemented by extending the open-source hostapd and
wpa_supplicant software components in Raspberry Pi.
1. EAP notification message;
2. Additional attribute in existing EAP method’s message;
3. EAP-iPROV run as an inner method in TLS tunnel;
4. EAP-oPROV: an outer EAP method that first authenticates the peer using some inner
EAP method, and then runs EAP-iPROV.
Based on our analysis and experiments, option (4) gives the most flexibility for adding client
tokens in EAP. Moreover, EAP-oPROV is a generic method for extending EAP functionality. It
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could be applied in scenarios other than provisioning and configuration.
Future work could include standardization of EAP-oPROV and finding additional scenarios





A. Additional information about EAP methods
The EAP methods commonly used in WiFi networks are EAP-TTLS, EAP-FAST, EAP-PEAP,
EAP-LEAP and EAP-TLS [34]. For instance, Eduroam [8] provides support for EAP-TLS,
EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP. The WiFi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) standard recommends these
EAP methods with an addition of EAP-FAST. Table 1.1 shows that, with an exception of EAP-
FAST, these EAP methods are supported in Android, Linux and Windows operating systems;
EAP-FAST is currently supported only in Linux.
EAP method Android Linux Windows
EAP-TTLS + + +
EAP-TLS + + +
EAP-PEAP + + +
EAP-AKA + + +
EAP-SIM + + +
EAP-FAST - + -
Table 1.1. Support for EAP methods recommended in WPA2 [35][36][37].
support: “+”, no support: “-”






EAP-PWD no no yes mutual
EAP-POTP no no yes client or mutual
EAP-SIM yes no yes mutual
EAP-AKA’ yes no yes mutual
EAP-TLS yes yes yes mutual
EAP-TTLS yes yes yes mutual
EAP-TEAP yes yes yes mutual
EAP-PEAP yes yes yes mutual
EAP-FAST yes yes yes mutual
EAP-CREDS no no no none
Table 1.2. Properties of EAP methods
In the rest of this Appendix we list EAP methods that can be used with EAP-oPROV. The
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methods in this list where selected using the following criteria:
• The method includes mutual authentication resulting in session key.
• There is a public specification of the method.
• The source code is publicly available.
A.0.1 EAP-PWD
EAP-PWD (Password) [23] was initially developed for secure connection of a user on a computer
with a password stored on a remote server. EAP-PWD allows creation of high entropy key
material from the low entropy password. EAP-PWD requires three message exchanges:
• Identity message: it provides the identity of the user
• Challenge message: it provides data for verifying the password
• Confirmation message: it provides the response to the previous challenge
EAP-PWD does not support message fragmentation. A successful EAP-PWD authentication
results in sharing of key material between the peer and the authentication server.
A.0.2 EAP-POTP
EAP-POTP (Protected One-Time Password) [24] was initially developed for OTP (One-Time
Password) tokens electronically connected to the authenticating computer. It provides one-way
or two-way authentication. EAP-POTP provides a framework for the execution of a specific type
of credential, a shared secret key, and supports multiple algorithms to perform the challenges
verifying the shared secret. EAP-POTP uses TLV as attribute format and protects its content
with encryption authenticity verification.
A successful EAP-POTP authentication results in sharing of key material between the peer
and the authentication server.
A.0.3 EAP-SIM
EAP-SIM [14] (Subscriber Identity Modules) was initially developed as a second generation
mobile network standard. It allows server or mutual authentication and fast re-authentication.
EAP-SIM does not support fragmentation. A successful EAP-SIM authentication results in
sharing of key material between the peer and the authentication server.
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A.0.4 EAP-AKA’
EAP-AKA’ (Authentication and Key Agreement) [22] is an EAP method for LTE(4G). It allows
mutual authentication. The attributes in the EAP payloads are in TLV format. The steps of
the protocol are:
• phase one: receiving the identity of the client. The authenticator receives the identity
and verifies the validity by contacting the correct authentication server. If successful, the
authentication server returns a vector allowing verification of the identity.
• phase two: the authenticator sends a challenge to the peer based on the received vector.
The peer can determine the authenticity of the authenticator by verifying the correctness
of the challenge, which requires the knowledge of the vector sent by the authentication
server. The peer replies with a challenge response.
EAP-AKA’ allows fast reauthentication and accepts extensions with skippable attributes in the
payloads. It does not support fragmentation: all messages should be smaller than 1020 bytes –
according to the specification. A successful EAP-AKA’ authentication results in sharing of key
material between the peer and the authentication server.
Please note that EAP-AKA’ (and EAP-SIM) require the client to have a SIM card, i.e. the client
has to have cellular network subscription.
A.0.5 EAP-PEAP
EAP-PEAP (Protected Authentication Protocol) [15] is a mutual authentication method initially
developed for wireless networks. The steps of the protocol are:
• phase one: the peer and authentication server involve in a TLS handshake. This step
provides server authentication and a secure communication channel.
• phase two: this phase executes another EAP method inside EAP-PEAP messages. The
inner EAP method provides client authentication.
EAP-PEAP is close from EAP-TTLS. A successful EAP-PEAP authentication results in sharing
of key material between the peer and the authentication server.
A.0.6 EAP-FAST
EAP-FAST (Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling) [4] performs server authentica-
tion and optional client authentication. It is meant to be lightweight for wireless network
improvement. The steps of the protocol are:
• phase one: a TLS handshake provides server authentication and a secure communication
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channel
• phase two: inner EAP methods can be run sequentially as TLV attributes. The purpose is
client authentication and key material setting.
EAP-FAST supports fragmentation and provisioning of a Protected Access Credential (PAC). A
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